Courting Civilians During Conflict: Evidence from Taliban Judges in Afghanistan
Published in Conditionally Accepted, International Organization, 2024
Rebels regularly provide public services - especially legal services - but the consequences of such programs are unclear. We argue rebel courts can boost civilian support for insurgency and augment attack capacity by increasing the legitimacy of the rebellion, creating a vested interest in rebel rule, or by enabling rebel coercion of the civilian population. We study the impact of the Taliban’s judiciary by leveraging cross-district and overtime variation in exposure to Taliban courts using a trajectory balancing design. We find courts reduced civilian support for the government and increased support for the Taliban, and were associated with more attacks and coalition casualties. Exploring mechanisms, we find courts resolved major interpersonal disputes between civilians, facilitated more insurgent intimidation of civilians, and that changes in public opinion are unlikely to have been driven solely through social desirability bias. Our findings help explain the logic of rebel courts and highlight the complex interactions between warfare and institutional development in weak states.
Recommended citation: Donald Grasse, Renard Sexton, Austin Wright "Courting Civilians During Conflict: Evidence from Taliban Judges in Afghanistan" https://donaldgrasse.github.io/files/Courting_Civilians_During_Conflict__Evidence_from_Taliban_Judges_in_Afghanistan.pdf